should be seen not just as a binomial contrast, but as a continuous attribute. In addition, we stress that the entrepreneurial strategy to go (partly) informal needs to be considered in conjunction with the alternative strategy of remaining fully in the legal sphere.
We emphasize that that the informality strategy is le- The final building block of our framework is to stress the environmental context, where government legitimacy is particular difficult to achieve, where law enforcement is weak, and the level of institutional trust is low. That relates in particular to economies where government administration is being rebuilt following breaks and discontinuities in the institutional and political systems (Welter and Smallbone, 2011) . We emphasize that such environment undermines social identification of the business-managers with the national polity and erodes their tax morale even further.
Furthermore, our focus on tax morale ensures consistency between theory development and opportunities for empirical testing. Being illegal is a sensitive topic which makes collection of direct data on behavior difficult and subject to biases (Gerxhani, 2007) . Concentrating on tax morale may be a good way to gain empirical insights related to the issue of tax evasion, as tax morale has been found to be negatively related to income tax evasion on the micro-level (Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Wenzel, 2005) and to the size of the informal economy on the macro-level (Torgler and Schneider, 2009) . Furthermore, the entrepreneurship cognition literature emphasizes the role of owner-manager attitudes and intentions in shaping their behavior and business strategies (Wikilund, 2003) . By focusing on business tax evasion we add to the literature which has overwhelmingly focused on individuals and personal income tax with little attention paid to the business tax evasion, especially in empirical studies.
In the context of these arguments, we concentrate on how tax morale of business owner-managers' is related to their perceptions of the institutional and social context. Our spotlight is on a transitional economy and that enables us both to illustrate the limitations of the existing theory frameworks and to offer some extensions. In particular, we argue that relationship between legality and legitimacy is a complex one, and the former should not be seen as a subset of the latter; rather, these two intersect. Furthermore, we extend the theory linking entrepreneurship with political frameworks (Ireland, Tihanyi and Webb, 2008) ; here, we stress the impor- norms of behavior observed in the close neighborhood of the entrepreneur. This implies that while our direct objective is to add to understanding of the legitimization of the strategies based on participation in the informal economy, our research makes also a significant contribution providing a theory framework that can be applied to other aspects of entrepreneurial strategies.
Finally, from the wider policy perspective, focusing on entrepreneurial attitudes towards taxes is important as tax avoidance may lead to a vicious circle, where shrinking tax base falls on a fewer number of businesses, pushing even more entrepreneurs into informality. That leads to dual (formal versus informal) business structures, which are detrimental to entrepreneurship (Estrin and Mickiewicz, forthcoming) and in turn may contribute to fiscal implosion, as vividly illustrated by the recent case of a collapse of an established EU member state, yet characterized by such a dual economy, Greece.
Therefore, understanding entrepreneurs' attitudes towards tax compliance is also a crucial policy issue.
Building on this, we focus on antecedents of informality, in particular on entrepreneurs' attitudes towards tax evasion. The cases we discuss relate to businesses that are officially registered, so if they do undertake to evade taxes some activities remain legal whilst others are illegal. In particular, these firms follow legal ends (producing legal products), yet in part adopt illegal means by, say, illegal employment and related non-compliance in tax reporting (including social insurance contributions). As emphasized by Webb et al. (2009) such cases are more difficult to detect than those of ventures that adopt illegal ends. Tax evasion, like rent seeking and other deviant forms of entrepreneurial behavior, implies that some entrepreneurial effort is allocated to unproductive activities (Baumol, 1990) . It may also imply suboptimum choice of business strategies.
While we stress the theory of informality anchored in entrepreneurship research (Webb et al., 2009) , we also account for insights drawn from the tax compliance literature, and the strand in that literature that stresses tax morale, which we emphasize. Traditionally, the tax morale literature has addressed an issue of why entrepreneurs do not pay taxes utilizing the expected utility framework.
Consistent with the latter, paying taxes has been understood as a function of evaluating the risks of being caught and the severity of punishment if caught (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) . However, one of the main conclusions from this research stream is that tax evasion is much lower than can be explained by these deterrence factors (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein, 1998 In this section we discuss our theory framework. Consistent with a link between the cognition and attitudes (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 2001; Mitchell et al, 2004) , we expect attitudes towards taxes to be affected by beliefs related to political institutions, government and the tax authority. We build our framework around the concept of legitimacy of the government, and also emphasize the importance of identification with the national polity that leads to higher tax morale. The perceived legitimacy of the government relate to legitimacy, trust and fairness, but also its effectiveness. In addition these macro-micro level links affecting entrepreneurial behavior need to be supplemented with meso-micro links that reflect the influences of the proximate business environment. We present our framework as Figure 1 .
We posit that business owner-managers' perceptions of the context within which they pay taxes influence their attitudes towards tax avoidance. We define this context both by the formal institutional environment (at the macro level) and by the social business environment (at the meso level), yet before discussing both dimensions in turn, we briefly present the concept of legitimacy.
As just argued, propensity to cooperate, comply with expected behavior and a sense of obligation is always either enhanced or reduced conditional on the legitimacy of the institution to which the obligation relates.
Taxes are an obligation paid to the state through the tax authority, to provide money to be spent by the government. However, if an individual does not believe the recipients of these taxes (the tax authority and the government) to be trustworthy and honest, or does not believe the rules according to which the tax revenue is collected and/or spent to be fair, this is likely to undermine the attitude that taxes should always be paid. In such circumstances, the government and tax authority face low legitimacy. The legitimacy of the government and tax administration may be undermined both by poor law that leaves opportunities for arbitrary treatment, and by poor practice of public administration that may lead to corruption and favoritism. The latter may to some extent occur independently of the quality of the legal system, which may be disregarded by public servants. This possibility arises as the behavior of administrators is affected both by the formal frameworks and by the informal norms, and the latter tend to be persistent (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) . However, at the same time, public goods considerations suggest that the provision of government services to firms and individuals who evade taxes should not be withdrawn even if it was technically possible. That explains why empirically we rarely observe any direct effort by any government to make some public good provision conditional on evidence on tax compliance. such policies would not only have to rely on widespread costly verification, but would also be economically inefficient. Correspondingly, in addition to direct influence coming from strong social ties, observed peer behavior impacts attitudes adopted by an entrepreneur. Accordingly, the effects of perceptions that others businesses are underreporting affects own tax morale. Again, this factor may have a particularly strong impact where identity with a wider polity remains problematic: deficiency in the higher levels of social identity makes identities that are local more important.
We argue that the more the firms' owners-managers believe that others in their position are evading taxes, the more likely they are to perceive that tax evasion is justifiable. Consistent with our framework, we stress the mechanisms, where norms of behavior observed in close social neighborhood may be gradually internalized and Our first two hypotheses relate to legitimacy of both the government spending revenue collected via taxes, and of tax authorities. For our first hypothesis we take a standard measure of confidence in government, which again is copied from the WVS. For the second hypothesis we verified that the best way to proceed is to aggregate three individual questions related to trust in tax authorities into a three-item scale (Cronbach Alpha = 0.71; details in Table 2 ). This leads gradually to the situation where illegal behavior becomes legitimate. However, a parallel argument may be drawn from the rational choice theory. When others appear to be free-riding by not paying taxes we move to a context that corresponds to the prisoner's dilemma: with more competitors avoiding taxes, the business cost of conforming to legal tax norms increases fast.
Thus, once such strategies become widespread, they also become dominant (in the game-theoretic sense).
Based on these two lines of argument, we posit: Table 2 .
We control for respondent age, gender, ethnicity, education and business experience. We also include firm size The state revenue service: (i) is corrupt (reverse coded); (ii) administers the tax system fairly;
(iii) is generally honest in the way it deals with people 5 = strongly agree … 1 = strongly disagree community belonging Being a member of the latvia community is important to me 5 = strongly agree … 1 = strongly disagree Perceived underreporting scale formed from average from three questions asking respondents to estimate the degree of underreporting of business incomes (net profits), number of employees and official salary levels.
1= no underreporting 4 = report > 33% and < 50% 2 = report > 75% and < 100% 5 = report > 0 % and < 33% 3 = report > 50% and < 75% 6 = report 0% chances of being caught scale formed by adding respondents assessment of chance of being caught for each type of underreporting -business incomes, number of employees, official salary levels.
chance of firm being caught: 1 = about 0 % 2 = about 25% 3 = about 50% 4 = about 75% 5 = almost certain, 100% severity If a firm did get caught seriously underreporting how severe are the typical consequences:
severity of punishment 1 = not severe at all, minimal impact 2 = it will suffer some financial penalties 3 = it will suffer serious financial penalties and become unprofitable 4 = it will suffer serious financial penalties and may go out of business 5 = it will go out of business (1) (2) (2)- (3) that provide variants with likelihood of being caught and severity of punishment omitted in turn, to explore the impact of multicollinearity from which specification (1) may suffer. Models (4)- (6) these results correspond to models (7)- (9). To investigate robustness of our results we also used the original 10-point response for our dependent variable. The results on our key variables do not differ and are available on request.
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methods methods
To illustrate more clearly the effects of our key independent variables we plot predicted probability curves in Comparing our measures used for H1 and H2, we found more support for the latter. We cannot reject that trust in tax administration has significant impact on tax morale in all our specifications; the result is entirely robust to different specification and to variance in sample size.
In contrast, the result on the evaluation of the government activities is sensitive to the model applied and change is sample size, alternating between significant and insignificant. In Panel B (Figure 2) , the positive relation between trust in the tax administration and tax morale is shown. The predicted probability of thinking tax evasion is justified (tax morale =1) falls from 0.28 when there is no trust in the tax administration to 0.09 when there is very high trust in the tax administration, and a mirror effect is that the predicted probability of "tax evasion is never justified" (tax morale=5) increases from 0.09 to 0.22. A similar pattern in predicted probabilities can be seen in Panel A (Figure 2 ) when considering the impact of changes in trust in government on tax morale. The predicted probability of "tax evasion is justified" (tax morale = 1) falls from 0.21 when The variable that captures social identity, that is a sense of belonging to the wider polity comes as significant and positive in all models (1)- (6) and only becomes insignificant due to smaller sample size used in models (7)- (9), providing support for H3. In Panel C (Figure 2) the plotted predicted probabilities show the positive relation between community belonging and tax morale.
The plot seems to indicate that an individual's identification with Latvian community has the strongest negative effect on the predicted probabilities of "tax evasion is often justified" (tax morale =1). The probabilities fall from 0.51 when the community belonging is strong to 0.13 when it is considered unimportant.
In turn, for H4, coefficients of perceptions of underreporting become insignificant in two out of three catchall models (i.e. in (1) and (7)), due to multicollinearity, yet the results hold in all other models. In Panel D (Figure 2) the plot shows the negative relationship between tax morale and perception of underreporting. The predicted probability that an individual will think that tax evasion is often justified (tax morale =1) increases, as the amount of perceived underreporting increases from a predicted probability of 0.11 (no perceived underreporting) to 0.33 when respondents perceive other business to reporting only between 0 -33% of items subject to tax. Parallel to this, the predicted probability of "tax evasion is never justified" (tax morale = 5) falls from 0.17 to 0.05.
To Pay or Not to Pay:
Entrepreneurs' Attitudes towards Tax Evasion (H6) is depicted in the plot of predicted probabilities in Panel E (Figure 2) . As beliefs about the severity of punishment increase from "minimal impact" to "serious, possibly leading to business closure", the predicted probability of "tax evasion being often justified" (tax morale = 1) falls from 0.25 to 0.10 and the predicted probability of "tax evasion never being justified" increases from 0.08 to 0.20.
Performance coefficients come as insignificant when captured by recent (annual) change (in models (4)- (6)), yet become significant and negative when longer (three year) period is taken into account in model (8). There is also some indication that larger employment size comes with lower tax morale, but only marginal (significant in models (1)- (4) and (6)). Sectoral differences are not significant apart from 'other sectors' and 'wholesale' categories becoming significant positive in some of the specifications, but this is hard to interpret. Location of the company plays no significant role.
Interestingly, none of the demographic variables such as age, gender, education, that are normally found to be related to tax morale, are significant in this research.
We expected an effect for age, based on a division between those who grew up and lived under communism and those that did not. We also expected ethnicity to be significant due to the divisions between ethnic Russians and ethnic Latvians in Latvia. However, we found no support for both. These results need to be read in the context of our specifications. They suggests that when focusing on owner-managers of businesses, the impact of these individual characteristics vanishes as soon as we control directly for social identity, perceptions of formal institutions, and for perceived behavior of other entrepreneurs. .3 pr(1) tax evasion always/often justified pr (2) pr (3) pr (4) pr (5) (2) pr (3) pr (4) pr (5) (2) pr (3) pr (4) pr ( .4
.5 pr(1) tax evasion always/often justified pr (2) pr (3) pr (4) pr ( .3 pr(1) tax evasion always/often justified pr (2) pr (3) pr (4) pr (5) Both macro and meso level phenomena affect behavior on micro level. Moreover, while the importance of these cross-level effects may be well understood by now, we still know far less about specific mechanisms and channels via which these effects operate. Here, the lenses of entrepreneurship research become particularly useful. While it has been long recognized in institutional economics that institutions affect individual behavior and economic outcomes (e.g. North, 1990; Williamson, 2000) , it is only with the focus on entrepreneur that we can understand more directly the mechanism via which the institutional contexts affect both cognition, values, attitudes and finally behavior. Thus, we demonstrate the effectiveness of combining institutional analysis with social psychology, as promoted for example by Harper (2003) . This offers more general lessons not just for the topic we study, but for wider entrepreneurship research.
At the same time, the limitations of our study are obvious. The sample size is limited, we have no panel element and we should be careful about the direction of causality. In particular, perceived social norms may be a reflection and rationalization of the individual's own behavior and view (implying reverse causality in H4).
This may be due to lack of knowledge about others' tax evasion behavior, or because of the wish for social support for own behavior or views (Wenzel, 2005) . Wenzel While in some circumstances, entrepreneurs may find ingenious way to organize themselves parallel to inept state bureaucracies, such organization comes with higher transaction costs, and the superior solution is always a sound tax system matched by the government supporting property rights and creating widespread opportunities for business (De Soto, 1989; 2001) . Informal economy is detrimental to entrepreneurship (Estrin and Mickiewicz, forthcoming) and therefore understanding which factors drive tax morale is critical.
Moreover, in is in the business context that questions about the tax morale should be asked and we hope that our paper makes some preliminary contribution in that direction.
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